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Abstract. In this paper, we consider continuous-variable quantum key distribution
with a discrete modulation, either binary or quaternary. We establish the security of
these protocols against the class of collective attacks that induce a linear quantum
channel. In particular, all Gaussian attacks are taken into account, as well as linear
attacks which add a non-Gaussian noise. We give lower bounds for the secret key rate
using extremality properties of Gaussian states.
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1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) appears to be the first real-world application of
the fastly growing field of quantum information theory [1]. QKD protocols aim at
distributing a secret key among distant parties, Alice and Bob, in such a way that an
eavesdropper, Eve, cannot learn anything about the key except with an arbitrary small
probability . Since the proposal of the first QKD protocol in 1984 [2], most schemes
have considered encoding information on two-level systems, such as the polarization
of a single photon. In such schemes Bob would recover this information with photon
counting techniques.
More recently, homodyne detection has been proposed to replace single photon
counters. The main advantages of homodyne detection are its higher quantum efficiency
and its greater technological maturity, both being consequences of the fact that
homodyne detection is implemented with PIN photodetectors which are commonly
used by the telecom industry. This is in sharp contrast with single photon detectors
which are almost specific to QKD. In protocols relying on homodyne detection, which
we refer to in the following as continuous-variable (CV) protocols by opposition to
discrete-variable (DV) protocols, one must encode the information differently than in
DV protocols: phase space replaces the traditional Bloch sphere describing the qubits
used in BB84 for instance. The first CV QKD protocols were exploiting phase space as
efficiently as possible by using coherent states with a Gaussian modulation [3] which is
the modulation maximizing the mutual (classical) information between the input and
the output of an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel. Such a channel
models accurately the effect of typical optical fibers on the quadratures of the EM field.
Using theorems about the optimality of Gaussian attacks, such schemes were proven
secure against collective attacks [4, 5, 6] then later against general attacks [7] and were
also successfully implemented [8, 9].
In order to reach significant transmission distances (with more than 3 dB losses),
two different techniques have been proposed : reverse reconciliation where the key
elements are a function of Bob’s measurement results [10, 11] and post-selection where
Alice and Bob discard the data for which Eve has learnt too much information [12].
However, the analysis of post-selected schemes is quite involved their security has been
established only against the restricted class of Gaussian attacks [13]. In this paper, we
consider protocols with a reverse reconciliation but without post-selection.
In practice, CV QKD has many advantages on the implementation point of view,
but up until now, it seemed restricted to smaller distances than photon-counting QKD,
and for instance it was unable to distribute secret keys over more than 50 km. The
reason for this comes from the difficulty to correct the errors between Alice and Bob’s
data induced by the quantum channel. If this is not a problem in principle as one
only needs to approach the Shannon capacity of a AWGN channel, it turned out to be
quite difficult to realize in practice for a Gaussian modulation [14]. For this reason,
using a discrete modulation instead of a continuous Gaussian modulation appeared as
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a possible solution as it greatly simplifies the error correction step. However, switching
from a continuous to a discrete modulation opens new theoretical questions as the proof
techniques used in [4, 5, 6] do not apply anymore. One therefore needs to develop a
new approach to prove the security of CV QKD protocols with a discrete modulation.
This was recently done in [15] for a protocol with a quaternary modulation. The new
technique allows one to establish the security of the protocol when the quantum channel
is linear. In particular, the noise added by the channel can be either Gaussian or non-
Gaussian. Moreover, one advantage of the proof is that it only requires to estimate
two experimental parameters, namaely the transmission T and excess noise ξ of the
quantum channel. Note that several protocols with a discrete modulation had been
studied before [15], but their security was only established against Gaussian attacks
[16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. In this paper, we review more in depth the proof of [15], and
apply it to analyze a protocol with a binary modulation, considering either homodyne
or heterodyne detection schemes.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we describe CV QKD
protocols with a discrete modulation and we insist particularly on two instances of such
protocols for which good error correction schemes are known: the four-state protocol
first recently introduced in [15] as well as a two-state protocol quite similar to the
protocol considered in [22]. Then, in Section 3, we present the general outline of the
security proofs of such protocols. We proceed with giving an explicit security proof for
each of them, respectively in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, we present the secret key
rate of the prootocols and conclude with their expected performances in Section 7 for
realistic, state of the art implementations. In the Appendix, we give some details about
the specific reconciliation procedure involved in these protocols.
2. CV QKD protocols with a discrete modulation
In the following, we consider two CV QKD protocols with a discrete modulation
involving respectively two and four coherent states. The four-state protocol was
introduced in [15]. The two-state protocol is a new protocol which shares similarities
with the protocol presented in [22] but displays a different choice of measurement for
Bob. Both modulation schemes are displayed on Figure 1.
In any such protocol, Alice sends n random coherent states drawn from either
S2 = {|αe−ipi/4〉, |αe3ipi/4〉} or S4 = {|αeipi/4〉, |αe3ipi/4〉, |αe5ipi/4〉, |αe7ipi/4〉} where α is
chosen to be a positive real number. Then, for each state, Bob performs an homodyne
measurement on a random quadrature x or p. Note that in the case of the two-state
protocol, Bob’s measurement is not the optimal measurement to distinguish between
the state |αe−ipi/4〉 and | − αe−ipi/4〉. For both protocols, Bob obtains the real random
variable yi for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Alice and Bob use a reverse reconciliation, and the sign bi
of yi encodes the raw key bit: we note bi = 1 if yi ≥ 0 and bi = 0 if yi < 0. Alice must
then recover the value of the string b = (b1, · · · , bn). To help her, Bob sends some side-
information consisting of the quadrature measured, x or p, the absolute value of yi for
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Figure 1. (Color online.) Encoding schemes used for the two-state protocol (left)
and the four-state protocol (right).
i ∈ {1, · · · , n} as well as the syndrome of b for a linear error correcting code Alice and
Bob agreed on beforehand. Alice then proceeds by decoding her word x = {x1, · · · , xn}
where xi corresponds to the sign of the quadrature Bob measured for the state she
sent. An alternative protocol for the four-state protocol consists for Bob to perform
an heterodyne (instead of homodyne) measurement [23, 24]. In this case, he measures
both quadratures, and obtains two measurement results yxi and y
p
i for each state sent
by Alice. The raw key now consists of both signs of yxi and y
p
i .
As usual in all QKD schemes, a supplementary step has to be added for channel
estimation: Alice and Bob reveal a fraction of their data and compute the covariance
matrix of the state ρAB that they would share in an entanglement-based version of the
protocol [25]. This allows them to compute an upper bound on Eve’s information on y,
the Holevo information S(y;E). If the error correcting code used by Alice and Bob has
a rate R, the secret key rate against collective attacks (in the limit where the fraction
of data revealed for parameter estimation becomes negligible) reads:
K = R− S(y;E). (1)
R is upper bounded by the mutual information I(x; y) between Alice and Bob and one
can therefore introduce the reconciliation efficiency β defined as β = R/I(x; y). One
then finds the more common expression for the secret key rate:
K = βI(x; y)− S(y;E). (2)
With this expression, it is clear that being able to perform an efficient reconciliation,
with β close enough to 1, is crucial. Unfortunately, for a Gaussian modulation, the best
reconciliation schemes [26, 14] presently known see their efficiency drop under 50% at
low signal to noise ratios (SNR). This is rather dramatic in terms of the range of the
protocol as one needs to work at low SNR to distribute secret over long distances. A
hand waving argument for this fact is given now. It is known [27, 28] that the quantity
Kperf = I(x; y)− S(y;E) tends to a finite limit as the modulation variance VA of Alice
Continuous-variable Quantum Key Distribution protocols with a discrete modulation 5
tends to infinity. However, both quantities I(x; y) and S(y;E) diverge to infinity. As
a consequence, the penalty (1 − β)I(x; y) imposed by an imperfect reconciliation also
goes to infinity for any value of β stricly less than 1. Therefore, one should not work
with a large modulation variance as soon as the reconciliation is not perfect, which is
never the case. On the contrary, for a realistic reconciliation efficiency (around 80%),
the optimal modulation variance is typically quite low (less than 10 photons per pulse
on average). Associated with high loss channels, i.e. long distance, the SNR is finally
very low, well below 1 and reconciliation schemes for Gaussian modulation fail, meaning
that no secret key can be exchanged over long distances with such a scheme.
An appealing alternative appears with discrete modulation schemes. The reason
for this is that good reconciliation procedures can be found, even at very low SNR, for
some modulation schemes. More precisely, in the case of the BI-AWGN channel (where
Alice uses a binary modulation ±α on an AWGN channel), good error correction codes
are known at very low SNR [15]. Such a binary modulation scheme for error correction
can be implemented either with a two-state protocol with coherent states in S2 or a
four-state protocol with coherent states in S4. In particular, the error correcting codes
presented in [15] allow one to get a reconciliation efficiency of 80% for arbitrary low
SNR. The main drawback of such protocols is that the methods used to upper bound
S(y;E) in the protocol using a Gaussian modulation [4, 5, 6] cannot be directly applied
in the case of a discrete modulation scheme. One then needs to come up with a security
proof specific to such protocols. We address this question in the next section.
In the remaining of the document, we use the notation γ = αe7ipi/4 = αe−ipi/4 so
that the set S2 of coherent states used in the two-state protocol is {|γ〉, | − γ〉}.
3. General outline of the security proofs
The security of the various protocols we consider here is studied through entanglement-
based versions of the protocols. In the prepare and measure version of the protocols
that are used in practice, Alice randomly draws n binary or quaternary variables, each
corresponding to a specific coherent state of S2 for the two-state protocol or of S4 in
the case of the four-state protocol. Alice then prepares these n coherent states and
sends them to Bob through the quantum channel. In the entanglement-based version
of the protocol, Alice starts with a pure bipartite state |Φ2〉 (or |Φ4〉, depending on
the protocol) and performs a projective measurement on the first half of this state.
The second half is sent to Bob through the quantum channel. For instance, in the
protocol with a Gaussian modulation [3], the initial bipartite state is a two-mode
squeezed vacuum, and the projective measurement performed by Alice is an heterodyne
measurement, which projects the second half of the state on a coherent state [25]. The
covariance matrix ΓTMS of the two-mode squeezed vacuum reads
ΓTMS =
(
(1 + 2α2)12 ZG σz
ZG σz (1 + 2α
2)12
)
, (3)
Continuous-variable Quantum Key Distribution protocols with a discrete modulation 6
where σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
and ZG = 2
√
α4 + α2. Rewriting ΓTMS with a direct reference
to Alice’s modulation variance VA in the prepare and measure protocol, one has:
ΓTMS =
(
(VA + 1)12 ZG σz
ZG σz (VA + 1)12
)
. (4)
As the second half of the state is sent through a quantum channel characterized by its
transmission T and excess noise ξ, one can write the covariance matrix ΓG of the state
ρAB Alice and Bob share in the CV QKD protocol with a Gaussian modulation:
ΓG =
(
(VA + 1)12
√
TZG σz√
TZG σz (TVA + 1 + Tξ)12
)
. (5)
Then the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s measurement result can be upper
bounded by a function of ΓG [5]. Note indeed that the argumentation in [5] does no rely
on the fact that the state considered is indeed Gaussian: only the covariance matrix
of the states matters. This is not the case in [4] and [6] where the proof technique
explicitely requires the modulation to be Gaussian.
For the protocols of interest in this article, the goal is to apply the same type
of proof technique. We therefore want to find a purification |Φ2〉 (resp. |Φ4〉) with a
covariance matrix Γ2 (resp. Γ4) as close as possible as the one of a two-mode squeezed
state. This covariance matrix has the following form:
Γ2,4 =
(
(VA + 1)12 Z2,4 σz
Z2,4 σz (VA + 1)12
)
, (6)
and the goal is to find a bipartite state |Φ2〉 (resp. |Φ4〉) such that Z2 (resp. Z4) is as
close as possible of ZG. Of course, in order to be a legitimate entanglement-based version
of the protocol, the bipartite initial state must be such that there exists a projective
measurement that Alice can perform that projects the second half of the state onto the
desired 2 (or 4) coherent states of the set S2 (or S4). Also, it is worth emphasizing
that, while the security proof of the Gaussian protocol is based on (virtual) Gaussian
entanglement, the present proof is based on (virtual) non-Gaussian entanglement, which
appears in this context as a convenient theoretical tool.
Now, the main idea of the discrete modulation protocols we study here is that there
exists a regime for the modulation variance, VA, such that{
I2(x; y) ≈ I4(x; y) ≈ IG(x; y),
S2(y;E) ≈ S4(y;E) ≈ SG(y;E) (7)
but with β2 ≈ β4  βG. Here, the various subscripts 2, 4, G refer to the different
protocols: the binary modulation, the quaternary modulation and the Gaussian
modulation. The existence of this regime allows one to have K2, K4 > 0 for distances
where the secret key rate for a Gaussian modulation KG is null.
The next two sections are concerned with the study of such states |Φ2〉 and|Φ4〉 and
computing the correlation terms Z2 and Z4 of their covariance matrices.
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4. Two-state protocol
We introduce a new QKD protocol involving two coherent state {|αe−ipi/4〉, |−αe−ipi/4〉}
where the detection is an homodyne measurement on a randomly chosen quadrature x
or p. This protocol is quite similar to the protocol studied in [22] but the difference
between the two protocols is that in [22], the two coherent states are modulated along
one of the quadratures measured by Bob. This is not the case here. The security analysis
follows the same lines as for the recently introduced four-state protocol [15].
In the prepare and measure version of the protocol, Alice sends the coherent states
{|γ〉 and | − γ〉} with probability 1/2 to Bob. Hence Bob sees a mixture ρ2 given by:
ρ2 =
1
2
(|γ〉〈γ|+ | − γ〉〈−γ|) (8)
= µ0|φ0〉〈φ0|+ µ1|φ1〉〈φ1|, (9)
where µ0 = e
−α2 coshα2, µ1 = e−α
2
sinhα2 and
|φ0〉 = 1√
coshα2
∞∑
n=0
(−i)n(α)2n√
(2n)!
|2n〉, (10)
|φ1〉 = 1√
sinhα2
∞∑
n=0
e−ipi/4
(−i)nα2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|2n+ 1〉. (11)
In order to use the proof technique described in the previous section, we need to
consider the entanglement based version on the protocol. In this version, Alice starts
with a bipartite non-Gaussian pure state |Φ2〉. She performs a projective measurement
on one half of the state and sends the other half to Bob through the quantum channel.
Depending on the binary result of her measurement, the state sent to Bob is either |γ〉
or | − γ〉 with equal probabilities. Let us consider the following purification for ρ:
|Φ2〉 = √µ0|φ∗0〉|φ0〉+
√
µ1|φ∗1〉|φ1〉 (12)
where |φ∗0〉 and |φ∗1〉 are simply defined as:
|φ∗0〉 =
1√
coshα2
∞∑
n=0
(i)n(α)2n√
(2n)!
|2n〉, (13)
|φ∗1〉 =
1√
sinhα2
∞∑
n=0
eipi/4
(i)nα2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|2n+ 1〉, (14)
where we recall that α is a positive number. |Φ2〉 can also be rewritten as:
|Φ2〉 = 1√
2
|ψ0〉|γ〉+ 1√
2
|ψ1〉| − γ〉 (15)
with {
|ψ0〉 = 1√2 (|φ∗0〉+ |φ∗1〉)
|ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|φ∗0〉 − |φ∗1〉)
(16)
At this point, it is worth noting that in the entanglement based version of the
protocol, Alice simply applies the projective measurement {|ψ0〉〈ψ0|, |ψ1〉〈ψ1|} to the
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first half of the state |Φ2〉 and that she therefore projects the second half either on the
coherent state |γ〉 or the coherent state | − γ〉 with equal probabilities. The Wigner
functions of the orthogonal non-Gaussian states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 corresponding to Alice’s
projective measurement are displayed on Figure 2. Note that |ψ0〉 is peaked close to the
coherent state |αeipi/4〉 while |ψ1〉 is peaked close to |αe5ipi/4〉.
Figure 2. (Color online.) Wigner functions of the states |ψ0〉 (left) and |ψ1〉 (right)
of the two-state protocol for α2 = 0.01 unit of shot noise.
We now proceed with evaluating the covariance matrix Γ2 of |Φ2〉. Straightforward
algebraic manipulations show that it has the following form:
Γ2 =
(
X12 Z2 σz
Z2 σz Y 12
)
(17)
with 
X = 〈Φ2|2a†a+ 1|Φ2〉
Y = 〈Φ2|2b†b+ 1|Φ2〉
Z2 = 〈Φ2|ab+ a†b†|Φ2〉
(18)
where a, a† and b, b† are respectively the annihilation and creation operators on Alice
and Bob’s modes of the state.
In order to compute X, one can consider the state ρA =
1
2
(|γ∗〉〈γ∗|+ | − γ∗〉〈−γ∗|)
obtained by tracing over the second subsystem of |Φ2〉:
X = 〈Φ2|2a†a+ 1|Φ2〉 (19)
= tr(2a†a+ 1)ρA (20)
= 1 + tr(a†a|γ〉〈γ|) + tr(a†a| − γ〉〈−γ|) (21)
= 1 + 2α2 (22)
since a| ± γ〉 = ±γ | ± γ〉. The symmetry of the state |Φ2〉 shows that
Y = 〈Φ2|2b†b+ 1|Φ2〉 = X. (23)
One easily notes that
a|φ0〉 = −iα
√
µ1
µ0
|φ1〉 (24)
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and
a|φ1〉 = iα
√
µ0
µ1
|φ0〉. (25)
Hence, applying the operator ab on the state |Φ2〉 gives:
ab|Φ2〉 = α2
(
µ0√
µ1
|φ∗0〉|φ0〉+
µ1√
µ0
|φ∗1〉|φ1〉
)
(26)
and:
〈Φ2|ab|Φ2〉 = α2
(
µ
3/2
0
µ
1/2
1
+
µ
3/2
1
µ
1/2
0
)
= α2
1 + e−4α
2
√
1− e−4α2 (27)
and finally
〈Φ2|Z2|Φ2〉 = 〈Φ2|ab+ a†b†|Φ2〉 (28)
= 2Re〈Φ2|ab|Φ2〉 (29)
= 2α2
1 + e−4α
2
√
1− e−4α2 (30)
The quantity Z2 is displayed on Figure 4. For a variance of modulation less than
0.05, that is α / 0.15, Z2 is almost indistinguishable from ZG thus suggesting that in
this regime, S2(y;E) ≈ SG(y;E). This behaviour will be confirmed in Section 7.
5. Four-state protocol
In this section, we study the protocol recently introduced in [15]. More specifically, we
introduce a non-Gaussian state |Φ4〉 that can be used in an entanglement-based version
of the protocol and for which we compute the covariance matrix.
In the prepare and measure version of the protocol, Alice sends the coherent states
{|γ〉, |γ∗〉, | − γ〉 and | − γ∗〉} with probability 1/4 to Bob. Hence Bob sees a mixture ρ4
given by:
ρ4 =
1
4
(|γ〉〈γ|+ |γ∗〉〈γ∗|+ | − γ〉〈−γ|+ | − γ∗〉〈−γ∗|) (31)
= λ0|φ0〉〈φ0|+ λ1|φ1〉〈φ1|+ λ2|φ2〉〈φ2|+ λ3|φ3〉〈φ3|, (32)
where {
λ0,2 =
1
2
e−α
2
(cosh(α2)± cos(α2))
λ1,3 =
1
2
e−α
2
(sinh(α2)± sin(α2)) (33)
and
|φk〉 = e
−α2/2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉 (34)
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Applying the annihilation operator a to |φk〉 gives:
a|φk〉 = α
√
λk−1√
λk
|φk−1〉 (35)
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for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
a|φ0〉 = −α
√
λ3√
λ0
|φ3〉. (36)
Let us now introduce the following purification |Φ4〉 of the state ρ4:
|Φ4〉 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉. (37)
This state can also be written as:
|Φ4〉 = 1
2
(|ψ0〉|γ∗〉+ |ψ1〉| − γ〉+ |ψ2〉| − γ∗〉+ |ψ3〉|γ〉) (38)
where the states
|ψk〉 = 1
2
3∑
m=0
ei(1+2k)mpi/4|φm〉 (39)
are orthogonal non-Gaussian states. These states are displayed on Figure 3.
Figure 3. (Color online.) Wigner functions of the states |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 and |ψ3〉 for
α2 = 0.5 unit of shot noise.
In the entanglement-based version of the protocol, Alice needs to perform
a projective measurement having these states as eigenstates, in order to project
the second half of |Φ4〉 on one of the four coherent states of S4, namely
{|ψ0〉〈ψ0|, |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, |ψ3〉〈ψ3|}.
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Let us compute the covariance matrix Γ4 of the bipartite state |Φ4〉. One can show
that Γ4 has the following form:
Γ4 =
(
X12 Z4 σz
Z4 σz Y 12
)
(40)
where
X = Y = 〈Φ4|1 + 2a†a|Φ4〉 = 〈Φ4|1 + 2b†b|Φ4〉 (41)
= tr(1 + 2a†a ρ4) (42)
= tr(1 + 2
3∑
k=0
a†a λk|φk〉〈φk|) (43)
= 1 + 2
3∑
k=0
λk〈φk|a†a|φk〉 (44)
= 1 + 2α2
3∑
k=0
λk
λk−1
λk
(45)
= 1 + 2α2. (46)
We are now interested in the correlation term of the covariance matrix, that is
〈Φ4|Z4|Φ4〉 = 〈Φ4|ab+ a†b†|Φ4〉 (47)
= 2Re〈Φ4|ab|Φ4〉. (48)
One has:
ab|Φ4〉 = ab
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉 (49)
= α2
3∑
k=0
λk−1
λk
√
λk|φk−1〉|φk−1〉 (50)
where addition should be understood modulo 4. Finally, we obtain:
〈Φ4|Z4|Φ4〉 = 2α2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1
λ
1/2
k
. (51)
The behaviour of Z4 is plotted on Figure 4. For VA / 0.5, that is α / 0.5, Z4 and ZG
are almost indistinguishable, meaning that in this regime, one has S4(y;E) ≈ SG(y;E).
We confirm this intuition in the next section.
6. Secret key rate of the protocols
For both protocols, the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s measurement result
is upper bounded by the same quantity computed for a Gaussian state ρGAB with the
Continuous-variable Quantum Key Distribution protocols with a discrete modulation 12
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Figure 4. (Color online.) Comparison of the correlation Z2 for the two-state protocol
(lower curve), Z4 for the four-state protocol (middle curve) and for the Gaussian
modulation protocol ZG (upper curve) as a function of the modulation variance
VA = 2α
2.
same covariance matrix as the state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob in an entanglement-
based version of the protocol. Hence one can give a lower bound for both secret key
rates K2 and K4:{
K2 ≥ βI2(x; y)− S2(y;E),
K4 ≥ βI4(x; y)− S4(y;E). (52)
The expression for the upper bound on S2(y;E) (resp. S4(y;E)) is computed from the
symplectic eigenvalues ν1, ν2 of Γ2 (resp. Γ4) and from the eigenvalue ν3 of the matrix
Γhom2 (resp. Γ
hom
4 or Γ
het
4 depending on the nature of the measurement ) corresponding
to the covariance matrix of Alice’s state given the result y of Bob’s homodyne (or
heterodyne) measurement [8].
We computed in the previous sections the covariance matrix of the bipartite state
prepared by Alice, that is, before the quantum channel. In order to bound Eve’s
information, we need to know the covariance matrix Γ2,4 of the state shared by Alice
and Bob, that is, after the quantum channel.
In this paper, we make the assumption that the quantum channel is linear (see
Appendix A for details). In that case, one can easily use standard techniques from
statistics (see Ref. [29]) in order to estimate its transmission T and excess noise ξ.
The covariance matrix Γ2,4 of the state shared by Alice and Bob is given by:
Γ2,4 =
(
(VA + 1)12
√
TZ2,4σz√
TZ2,4σz (TVA + 1 + Tξ)12
)
. (53)
The reduced covariance matrix given Bob’s measurement result depends on the type of
measurement performed, either homodyne or heterodyne:
Γhom2,4 =
(
VA + 1− (Z2,4)
2
TVA+1+Tξ
0
0 VA + 1
)
(54)
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and
Γhet4 =
(
VA + 1− (Z2,4)
2
TVA+2+Tξ
0
0 VA + 1− (Z2,4)
2
TVA+2+Tξ
)
. (55)
Let us now explain how these covariance matrices can be estimated from
experimental data. Indeed, one should recall that these covariance matrices correspond
to a virtual bipartite state, namely the state that Alice and Bob would share in
the entanglement-based version of the protocol. Therefore, they cannot be measured
directly. Let us note x and y the respective random variables corresponding to Alice
and Bob’s classical data in the prepare and measure scenario. One can show that the
covariance matrices above can be derived from the observed second moments of the
variables x and y, that is 〈x2〉, 〈xy〉 and 〈y2〉. One has: VA = 〈x2〉, T = 〈xy〉2〈x2〉2 and
TVA + 2 + Tξ = 〈y2〉.
This shows that the covariance matrices in the entanglement-based scenario are
indeed accessible from the experimental data in the actual prepare and measure protocol,
assuming that the quantum channel is linear.
7. Theoretical performances
First, it is worth mentioning that the bounds for the Holevo information S(y;E) that
we derive from the covariance matrices of |Φ2〉 and |Φ4〉 are not proven to be tight.
Indeed, even in the case where the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is perfect,
that is, T = 1 and ξ = 0, the bounds we compute do not give S(b;E) = 0 as we
would expect, except in the limit of infinitely small modulation variances α → 0. This
is because the states |Φ2〉 and |Φ4〉 are not Gaussian. However, the approximation
becomes reasonably good for low modulation variances and one can expect the bounds
not to be too loose. An intriguing question is whether the value of S(y;E) computed
for the Gaussian protocol is an upper bound for the same quantity computed for the
discrete-modulation protocols. With the proof we presented, this is not the case (for
instance, for a perfect quantum channel, SG(y;E) = 0 as expected, whereas the bounds
we found for S2(y;E) and S4(y;E) are positive). It is quite natural to expect the
following relation to hold S2(y;E), S4(y;E) < SG(y;E) since a discrete modulation
never maximizes the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and it is doubtful that
it presents any advantage for a eavesdropper. However, our security proof cannot bring
a definitive answer to this question.
The performances of the two-state protocol are displayed on Figure 5 corresponding
to a realistic scheme where the reconciliation efficiency is only 80% and the quantum
efficiency of Bob’s detector is equal to 60% (these values are compatible with state-of-
the-art experimental implementations [9]). One can see from Figure 5 that the two-state
protocol can only work in a regime where the excess noise is very small: around 1/1000.
We note that this result is compatible with the results obtained in [22] where the authors
study the security of a slightly different version of the two-state protocol, where they
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Figure 5. (Color online.) Secret key rate K of the two-state protocol for a imperfect,
realistic reconciliation efficiency of 80% and a quantum efficiency of Bob’s detection
equal to 0.6. From top to bottom, excess noise is 0.001, 0.0015, 0.002. The respective
optimized modulation variances (in number of photons) are 0.015, 0.018 and 0.23.
need to assume the perfect knowledge of the probability distribution p(y|x) of Bob’s
measurements results given Alice’s results.
The performance of the four-state protocol with a homodyne detection is presented
on Figure 6 for an realistic reconciliation efficiency of 80% as well as a realistic quantum
efficiency of 60% for Bob’s detector (which is treated as part of the overall loss between
Alice and Bob). The performance of the protocol with a heterodyne detection is
displayed on Figure 7. One immediately notices that the four-state protocol performs
much better than its two-state counterpart, that is, it allows for a distribution of secret
keys over longer distances, and tolerates a much higher (and more reasonable) excess
noise. Note that choosing a homodyne or a heterodyne detection does not sensibly affect
the performances of the protocol. The better resistance to excess noise of these protocols
is extremely important because the results presented so far are a little too optimistic,
in the sense that they assume a perfect knowledge of the transmission and excess
noise (which is already infinitely less demanding that requiring a perfect knowledge
of the quantum channel, which is described by an infinite number of parameters). In
practice, however, these parameters can never be perfectly known, and they can only
be estimated with a precision depending on the number N − n of data used in the
parameter estimation. The main consequence of this imperfect parameter estimation
is to increase the effective excess noise, thus decreasing the actual performance of the
protocols. The finite size effects for CV QKD protocols are investigated elsewhere [29].
8. Conclusion
We introduced continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols displaying a
discrete modulation. We consider the cases of two and four state modulation. We
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Figure 6. (Color online.) Secret key rate K of the four-state protocol with a
homodyne detection for a imperfect, realistic reconciliation efficiency of 80% and a
quantum efficiency of Bob’s detection equal to 0.6. From top to bottom, excess noise
is 0.002, 0.004, 0.006, 0.008 and 0.01. The modulation variance (in number of photons)
is 0.125, that is VA = 0.25.
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Figure 7. (Color online.) Secret key rate K of the four-state protocol with a
heterodyne detection for a imperfect, realistic reconciliation efficiency of 80% and a
quantum efficiency of Bob’s detection equal to 0.6. From top to bottom, excess noise is
0.002, 0.004, 0.006, 0.008 and 0.01. The modulation variance (in number of photons)
is 0.125, that is VA = 0.25.
established the security of these protocols against collective attacks for which the
quantum channel is linear. As expected, the four-state protocol clearly outperforms the
two-state protocol. The generalization to modulation schemes with a higher number of
states may be considered, but it is not so straightforward as one would lose the main
advantage of the protocols presented here, that is, their very efficient reconciliation
procedure. However, if one allows for a heterodyne detection instead of a homodyne
detection, new continuous modulation schemes can lead to better performances [31].
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An important question at that stage is how to avoid the extra hypothesis that the
channel should be linear. As shown in Ref. [32], this can be done by using decoy states,
in order to embed the non-Gaussian modulation into an overall gaussian modulation.
It is then safe to evaluate the values of T and ξ from a gaussian probe beam, and then
to use them as described in the present paper.
Ackowledgements
This work received financial support from Agence Nationale de la Recherche under
projects PROSPIQ (ANR-06-NANO-041-05) and SEQURE (ANR-07-SESU-011-01).
Appendix A. Linear quantum channels
We shall define a linear quantum channel by the input-output relations of the quadrature
operators in Heisenberg representation :
Xout = gXXin +BX
Pout = gPPin +BP (A.1)
where the added noises BX , BP are uncorrelated with the input quadratures Xin, Pin.
Such relations have been extensively used for instance in the context of Quantum Non-
Demolition (QND) measurements of continuous variables [30], and they are closely
related to the linearized approximation commonly used in quantum optics. Gaussian
channels (channels that preserve the Gaussianity of the states) are usual examples of
linear quantum channels. However, linear quantum channels may also be non-Gaussian,
this will be the case for instance if the added noises BX , BP are non-Gaussian.
For our purpose, the main advantage of a linear quantum channel is that it will be
characterized by transmission coefficients TX = g
2
X , TP = g
2
P , and by the variances of the
added noises BX and BP . These quantities can be determined even if the modulation
used by Alice is non-Gaussian, with the same measured values as when the modulation
is Gaussian (because these values are intrinsic properties of the channel). The relevant
covariance matrix can then be easily determined, and Eve’s information can be bounded
by using the Gaussian optimality theorem.
Appendix B. Reconciliation at very low SNR
As we explained, the main reason a Gaussian modulation does no allow for key
distribution over very long distances because reconciliation of correlated Gaussian
variables is quite complicated at low SNR, and the present techniques are not efficient
in this regime. The main interest of the discrete modulations presented here is that
the reconciliation consists in a channel coding problem for the BI-AWGN channel,
which turns out to have efficient solutions. In this appendix, we describe in detail
this reconciliation procedure.
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For both modulation schemes, Bob will “see” an effective BI-AWGN channel for
either choice of quadrature. Assuming that the quantum channel is known and is indeed
Gaussian (which is the case in actual experiments), Alice and Bob can model their
classical data respectively as x = (x1, · · · , xn) (with xi = ±α/
√
2) and y = (y1, · · · , yn)
(here we only consider the data which are used to distill the key, that is, we assume
that the parameter estimation was already performed. We also assumed that Bob
has informed Alice of his choice of quadrature in the four-state protocol. Therefore,
yi corresponds to Bob’s measurement result for the signal i (normalized with the
transmission) and xi corresponds to the corresponding quadrature for Alice’s state.
The Gaussian channel model reads:
yi = xi + zi, (B.1)
where zi is a normal random variable with known variance σ
2 and xi is simply an
unbiased Bernoulli random variable (that we can assume takes values +1 or −1 up to a
simple renormalisation). With these notations, the SNR is given by:
SNR =
1
σ2
, (B.2)
and we would like to find reconciliation scheme that perform well, say β = 80%, for very
small values of the SNR, for instance 1/100, or even less.
Appendix B.1. Good low rate error correcting codes.
First of all, the reconciliation procedure is necessarily based on good error correcting
codes, such as low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [33]. Despite their great
performances, LDPC codes are not universal in the sense that they have not been
optimized for every channel. For instance, they perform very well for the BI-AWGN
channel when their rate is at least 0.2.
A special kind of LDPC codes was recently developed to work at reasonably low
SNR: the multi-edge type LDPC codes [34]. Such codes display good performances for
rates as low as 1/10. Even if they help working at low SNR, these codes do not solve
our problem completely as we would like codes working at much lower rates. What rate
do we need exactly? The rate R is linked to the reconciliation efficiency β through
β =
R
CGauss
, (B.3)
where
CGauss =
1
2
log2(1 + s) (B.4)
is the capacity of the AWGN channel (which is achieved with a Gaussian modulation)
and s is the SNR. Since in our protocol, we are restricted to a binary modulation, this
capacity cannot be reached, and the maximal value of the mutual information between
Alice and Bob is given by the capacity of the BI-AWGN channel, CBI−AWGN(s):
CBI−AWGN(s) = −
∫
φs(x) log2(φs(x))dx−
1
2
log2(2pie) +
1
2
log2(s) (B.5)
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where
φs(x) =
√
s
8pi
(
e−s(x+1)
2/2 + e−s(x−1)
2/2
)
. (B.6)
Quite interestingly, for small values of the SNR, both quantities CGauss and CBI−AWGN
are almost equal as can be seen on Figure B1. However, the two quantities are obviously
quite different for large SNR as the Gaussian capacity is unbounded whereas the capacity
for a binary modulation is upper bounded by 1: one cannot send more than one bit of
information per channel use with a binary modulation. With these notations, one can
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Figure B1. Channel capacities for an AWGN channel with a Gaussian modulation
(upper curves) and a binary modulation (lower curves) as a function of the signal-to-
noise ratio
rewrite the reconciliation efficiency as
β = βmodulation
R
CBI−AWGN
, (B.7)
where
βmodulation =
CGauss
CBI−AWGN
(B.8)
is a factor that rapidly tends to 1 as the signal-to-noise ratio tends to 0, and the second
term R/CBI−AWGN directly reflects the performance of a given code of rate R on the BI-
AWGN channel. In the limit of low SNR, we can approximate βmodulation ≈ 1, meaning
that the code rate that we require is given as a function of the SNR s by
R(s) ≈ β
2
log2(1 + s) (B.9)
≈ log2 e
2
β s. (B.10)
Since we want to fix the value of the reconciliation efficiency (for instance to 80%), we
see that we need to find error correcting codes with a rate proportional to the signal-
to-noise ratio. Hence, we would like to have a process such that if we know a code with
rate R and efficiency β for a SNR s, we can construct a code with rate R′ = R/k (for
some integer k ≥ 2) which achieves an efficiency β′ close to β at a SNR s′ = s/k. This
can be done quite simply with the idea of repetition code. Let us indeed consider the
following scenario: instead of sending a random xi = ±1 for each use of the channel,
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Alice sends k times the same value, that is, xi1 = xi2 = · · · = xik ≡ Xi. Hence Bob
receives k noisy versions of Xi:
yi1 = xi1 + zi1 (B.11)
yi1 = xi1 + zi1 (B.12)
· · · = · · · (B.13)
yik = xik + zik , (B.14)
where zi1 , zi2 , · · · , zik are k independent and identically distributed random variables:
zij ∼ N (0, σ2) for j ∈ {1, · · · , k}. Let us now consider the new random variables defined
as:
Xi ≡ 1
k
k∑
j=1
xij , Yi ≡
1
k
k∑
j=1
yij , Zi ≡
1
k
k∑
j=1
zij . (B.15)
One has
Yi = Xi + Zi, (B.16)
with Xi = ±1, and Zi ∼ N (0, σ2k ). The new channel with input Xi and output Yi is
therefore also a BI-AWGN channel but with a signal-to-noise ratio k times higher than
for the initial channel. Hence, if one knows a code with rate R achieving a reconciliation
efficiency β(s) for a BI-AWGN channel with SNR s, one can use a repetition scheme
length k to build a code of rate R′ = R/k achieving a reconciliation efficiency β′(s/k)
for a SNR s′ = s/k. The new reconciliation efficiency β′(s/k) is given by
β′(s/k) = β(s)
log2(1 + s)
k log2(1 + s/k)
. (B.17)
For small values of s, this gives β′(s/k) ≈ β(s) as expected. Unfortunately, as we said
before, good codes are not known for very small values of s, and the best low rate codes
presently available are the multi-edge type LDPC codes. In particular, the code of rate
1/10 described in [34] manages to decode reasonably well for a SNR of 0.17. This means
that this code is such that β(0.17) ≈ 88%. Using equation B.17, one observes that for
all k ≥ 1, β′(0.17/k) ≥ 80%. Hence, we can construct codes with arbitrarily low rate
that have a reconciliation efficiency greater that 80%. We plot the performance of such
codes on Figure B2 where we compare it with the reconciliation efficiency achieved with
a Gaussian modulation. The difference is striking for low SNR: our concatenation of
repetition codes with multi-edge type LDPC codes has a reconciliation efficiency alway
greater than 80% when the SNR tends to zero, whereas the reconciliation efficiency is
good (in the sense that in can be used in a CV QKD protocol) only for large enough
SNR.
Appendix B.2. Specificities of the reverse reconciliation.
Until now, we described a generic method to achieve a good reconciliation efficiency
on channels with arbitrarily low SNR. Unfortunately, the approach we described is not
directly compatible with QKD. The reason for this is two-fold:
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Figure B2. (Color online) Practical reconciliation efficiency for a binary modulation
(dashed line) and for a Gaussian modulation (full line) [26].
• first, Alice cannot choose to send k times in a row the same quantum state, as this
might give some information to the eavesdropper,
• but, more importantly, continuous-variable QKD uses reverse reconciliation,
meaning that Alice needs to guess Bob’s measurement result, and not the other way
around which would correspond to a direct reconciliation scheme. The problem here
is that Bob cannot decide to measure k times in a row the same value. Moreover, it
is not completely clear that the channel corresponding to the reverse reconciliation
procedure is a BI-AWGN channel as well. We now answer these two points.
Appendix B.3. The reverse reconciliation channel.
As we said, whereas the direct reconciliation channel is a BI-AWGN channel:
input : x = ±1 −→ output : y = x+ z with z ∼ N (0, σ2), (B.18)
it is not clear what the reverse reconciliation channel is, simply because its input in real-
valued (instead of binary), and that its output is binary instead of being real-valued! In
fact, it turns out that this reverse reconciliation channel can be transformed into a BI-
AWGN channel, if Bob sends some side-information to Alice. Our goal is to define two
variables u for Bob and v for Alice such that the channel mapping u to v is a BI-AWGN
channel. This can be done through the following procedure. First Bob computes two
values u and the side-information t from his variable y. These two numbers are defined
as {
u = y/|y|,
t = |y| (B.19)
Note that for an AWGN channel, the variables u and t are independent: the sign of y is
independent from its absolute value since the distribution of y is symmetric. One can
also note that u is a unbiased Bernoulli random variable, and therefore corresponds to
a legitimate input for a BI-AWGN channel. Now, t is considered as a side-information
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and is sent by Bob to Alice, who can use it to compute a random variable v defined as
v =
{
t if x = 1,
−t if x = −1. (B.20)
One can check that u and v are related through
v = u+ w, (B.21)
where
w = v − u (B.22)
= sgn(x)|y| − sgn(y) (B.23)
= sgn(y) (sgn(x)y − 1) (B.24)
= sgn(y) (sgn(x)(x+ z)− 1) (B.25)
= sgn(y) (1 + sgn(x) z − 1) (B.26)
= sgn(xy) z (B.27)
which means that w ∼ N (0, σ2) since Prob(sgn(xy) = 1) = Prob(sgn(xy) = −1) = 1/2.
Hence, the channel corresponding to the reverse reconciliation scenario, taking u as
input and v as output is a BI-AWGN channel.
Let us now show how one can apply the repetition trick to this channel. The main
problem now is that one would want ui1 to be equal to ui2 , · · · , uik . Obviously, there
is only one chance over 2k−1 for this to happen. The way to overcome this difficulty
is in fact quite simple. In the direct reconciliation protocol, Bob would need to guess
whether (xi1 , · · · , xik) equals (1, · · · , 1) or (−1, · · · ,−1). In the reverse reconciliation
protocol, Bob will inform Alice of the signs of yi2 , · · · , yik relatively to the sign of
yi1 (which therefore encode the relevant information), that is, Bob will give Alice the
following (k− 1) values: sgn(yi1yi2), · · · , sgn(yi1yik). Hence, in the reverse reconciliation
protocol, Alice needs to guess whether (yi1 , · · · , yik) equals (1, yi1yi2 , · · · , yi1yik) or
(−(1,−yi1yi2 , · · · ,−yi1yik). Clearly, this problem is completely equivalent to the direct
reconciliation case. In fact, this solution exactly corresponds to Bob informing Alice of
the syndrome of his bit string relative to the repetition code of length k.
To summarize, the reconciliation procedure starts with Alice and Bob having two
correlated vectors of length k × m: (x1, · · · , xkm) and (y1, · · · , ykm). Bob defines the
vector u = (u1, · · · , ukm) and sends some side information to Alice, namely the vector
t = (t1, · · · , tkm) as well as the m vectors (1, sgn(yki+1yki+2), · · · , sgn(yki+1yki+k) so that
Alice needs to guess the value of the vector U = (sgn(u1), sgn(uk+1), sgn(u2k+1), · · · ,
sgn(u(m−1)k+1)), which is a binary vector of length m. To do this, Alice and Bob first
agree on a particular multi-edge type LPDC code C, and Bob sends the syndrome of U
relative to C to Alice. Alice simply proceeds by decoding C in the coset code defined
by the syndrome in question, and recovers U.
To conclude, it is easy to adapt the error correction scheme to a reverse
reconciliation procedure: it simply involves for Bob to send some well-chosen side-
information to Alice through the authenticated classical channel. An important remark
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is that the role of the side-information is to help Alice to increase the speed and efficiency
of the error correction procedure. The eavesdropper, on the other hand, is supposed to
have perfect error correction available and cannot benefit of this side-information as long
as it is independent of the key. To see this, let us introduce some additional notations:
let synd be the syndrome information that Bob sends to Alice and |y| be the vector
corresponding to the absolute value of the vector y. The syndrome synd defines a coset
code C for which the word U is a codeword. Let RK be the index of this codeword:
this corresponds to the raw key that Alice and Bob will use for privacy amplification.
We want to bound Eve’s knowledge on RK given that she has access to the value of
synd and |y|. Using Lemma 1 of Ref. [14] and the fact that RK is independent of both
synd and |y|, one obtains:
S(RK; (E, synd, |y|)) ≤ S(RK, synd, |y|;E), (B.28)
that is S(RK; (E, synd, |y|)) ≤ S(y;E) which means that the reconciliation procedure
does not give any information to Eve about the raw key RK.
The repetition scheme presented above provides a simple method to build a good
code of rate R/k out of a code of rate R. This construction is not optimal compared
to using a very good error correcting code at the considered signal-to-noise ratio but
exhibits some interesting features. First, designing very good codes at low SNR is not
easy, and has not been intensively studied so far, mainly because the telecom industry
does not operate in this regime: this would not be economical since an important
number of physical signals would be required to send one information bit. The problem
is very different in QKD, where quantum noise is an advantage rather than a drawback.
A second advantage of this repetition scheme lies in its simplicity. As we mentioned
earlier, the main bottleneck of CV QKD is the reconciliation : it used to limit both the
range and the rate of the protocol. In particular, the rate is limited by the complexity of
decoding LDPC codes, which is roughly proportional to the size of the code considered
(in fact O(N logN)). If one uses a repetition scheme of length k, then the length of the
genuine LDPC code becomes m = N/k allowing a speedup of a factor k. The speed of
the reconciliation is not proportional to the number of signals exchanged by Alice and
Bob anymore, but to the mutual information they share, which is a major improvement
for noisy channels, i.e., long distance. Finally, the penalty in terms of reconciliation
efficiency imposed by using this scheme instead of a dedicated low rate error correcting
code is actually quite small, as soon as one knows a good low rate code. As we saw, a
multi-edge type code of rate 1/10 is sufficient for our purpose.
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